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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This paper reads the insistence on shame in Alain de Lille’s Plaint of Nature in light of the stringent 
regulation of deviant sexuality occurring in the twelfth century, mainly the Third Lateran Council of 1179 
and the invention of sodomy as a category. Because of this juridical prohibition, much criticism of Plaint of 
Nature has suggested that Alain forwards an anti-sodomitic stance, especially because Alain himself 
participated in the Third Lateran Council. This paper argues that Alain is actually not interested in 
regulating acts contra naturam, but interested in showing that regulatory impulse is an ethical failure in so 
far as it seeks to cleanse normative sexuality of its shame. Alain’s emphasis on the dreamer’s, Lady 
Natura’s, and the text’s hermaphroditism reminds us that shame is constitutive of sexuality in all its forms, 
and that shame itself can be ethically productive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
I. Introduction 
 Modeled after Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, Alain de Lille’s later twelfth-
century dream vision text, De planctu naturae, or Plaint of Nature, relates the encounter 
between the unnamed narrator (the dreamer) and the personification of Nature (Lady 
Natura). The Plaint opens with the dreamer’s lament, which gives way to the vision, or 
dream, of Lady Natura. Through their encounter, and thus, through the dream of the 
narrator, the fundamental “complaint” of Nature is revealed: the moral degeneration of 
society due to sodomitic practices. In other words, Lady Natura informs the dreamer that 
man has defiled himself from God through the sin of “unnatural” desire, explaining this 
sexual perversion in terms of grammatical perversion. At her own request, Nature calls 
for Genius, the priest-figure, to excommunicate sinners from the realm of nature, and 
thus, the dream concludes. The Plaint’s plot and content has prompted much criticism to 
focus on Alain’s investigation of “deviant” sexuality. Alain’s preoccupation with sodomy 
in his poetic dream vision was not unique in twelfth-century religious culture. Indeed, the 
Third Lateran Council of 1179, in which Alain participated, regulated acts contra 
naturam with new force. This juridical prohibition of sodomy was itself part of what 
Mark Jordan has argued advanced the invention of “sodomy” as a category in the twelfth 
century.
1
 
 These readings have offered interesting and insightful entrances into Alain’s text, 
but none has so far connected the Plaint’s interest in sexuality to its focus on shame, as 
the affect that not only prompts the formulation of the dream vision, but that is unlocked 
in the readers as well. In this essay, I consider how Plaint of Nature’s representation of 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Larry Scanlon’s “Speaking the Unspeakable: Sexual Regulation and the Priesthood of 
Genius,” as well as Mark Jordan’s The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology. 
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sexuality constitutes shame itself. This intersection between sexuality and shame, I 
believe, reframes customary criticism of the text’s regulation of sexuality. First, it shows 
how missing the ethics of shame limits understanding the poem as something other than 
merely a restrictive regulation of sexuality. In addition, it reveals how such regulation 
always produces more failure, and why that failure—experienced as shame—is ethically 
productive. I explore why focusing solely on Alain’s heaping shame on sodomites 
actually misses the extent to which even “upright” men are shamed in Plaint of Nature. 
Thus, I argue that Plaint of Nature is a critical, even ashamed, reflection on stringent 
regulatory efforts of the Third Lateran Council. 
 Additionally, I motivate my reading of Plaint of Nature overall as an effort to 
understand what puzzles most readers about it: namely, its extraordinary grammatical, 
poetic, and generic difficulty. As I have mentioned, criticism has viewed Alain’s text as 
forwarding an anti-sodomitic stance because it links sexual perversion with grammatical 
perversion. However, the text not only emphasizes, but relies on hermaphroditism. In 
many instances, the syntax folds back on itself. Even the Plaint in its entirety goes back 
and forth between poetry and prose. The Plaint, in other words, is self-reflexive at its 
core. The text’s unstable syntax and formality makes it difficult for readers to make sense 
of the language and the content, leaving us feeling shame ourselves. In other words, at 
times, this text is so difficult and frustrating to read because it doubles back on itself. To 
read it is to be inadequate to the task—to read it is to be shamed. Thus, if shame is what 
drives the poem and its ethics, we find that Alain’s text is not actually interested in 
condemning or regulating acts contra naturam. Rather, it codes all sexuality as queerly 
hybrid, advocating an ethics of productive, shared shame.  
 4 
 Finally, I frame Alain’s interest in shame and sexuality in a wide range of 
thinkers—from Augustine (who I see as informing Alain’s text) to contemporary queer 
theorists, including Michael Warner and Leo Bersani. I do so to not only help situate my 
reading of Alain’s representation of shamed sexuality, but to argue that there is more 
continuity between Christian accounts and modern-day queer accounts of shame, 
sexuality, and ethics than we have often realized. In other words, I aim to examine 
shame’s historical, and particularly literary, trajectory, one that has often gone unnoticed. 
Seeing this trajectory is important because it serves to remind that even “normative” 
sexuality is also subject to perversions. Ultimately, I view Plaint of Nature as an 
allegorical, “ethically”-grounded dream vision that causes the dreamer and the reader to 
not only self-examine, but reconsider interpersonal relations in affective ways—
pleasurable shame and shameful pleasure. 
II. Witnessing, Inhabiting, and Producing Shame 
 Augustine’s City of God provides the fundamental backdrop of the Plaint’s 
associating shame and sexuality. I see Augustine as an important context for Alain for 
two reasons. First, Augustine’s theory of sexuality was broadly influential in medieval 
Christianity. Many readers, including the Church cleric and lay, would have been familiar 
with Augustine’s accounts. Alain himself was a priest, and thus, would have been well-
versed in the theories of this Church doctor. Second, Augustine’s theory of sexuality 
highlights how sexuality is a vector of shame itself, while simultaneously emphasizing 
the import of pleasure within this sense of shame—much like Alain does in the Plaint. In 
City of God specifically, Augustine exposes how shame is constitutive of sexuality, and, 
in dramatic parallel, man’s fallenness from unity with the divine. For Augustine, shame is 
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postlapsarian. It is the affect that emerged after Adam and Eve’s Fall from God. 
Augustine notes that it is only “after they [Adam and Eve] violated God’s command by 
open transgression…the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were 
naked [and ashamed]” (XIV.xvii). Here, Augustine suggests that “proper” ethical 
relations are centered on man’s relationship with the divine. To live uprightly, man must 
live according to God, because “when man lives according to man, not according to God, 
he is like the devil…because the source of man’s happiness lies only in God, whom he 
abandons when he sins” (XIV.iv). A breach between man and God not only yields 
“fallenness,” but shame. Yet, for Augustine, shame itself accompanies lust, and is the 
“just punishment” for man’s disobedience or fall from God. He cites Adam and Eve’s 
shame, which specifically stems from their ‘lustful members’ rebelling against their will, 
noting: 
  Justly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these  
  members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a  
  certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called “shameful.” Their  
  condition was different before sin. For as it is written, “They were naked  
  and were not ashamed,” Genesis 2:25 — not that their nakedness was  
  unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because  
  not yet did lust move those members without the will’s consent; not yet  
  did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man  
  (XIV. xvii).  
Thus, Augustine understands shame as the result of Adam and Eve’s unrestrained, lustful 
members of the flesh—members that are moved by lust “without the will’s consent.” 
 6 
Here, it is not only a discrepancy between God’s wishes and man’s (fleshly) desires, but 
the rebellion of man’s body and will. In other words, Augustine claims that fallenness 
also has to do with the lack of “will’s consent.” This reveals that man’s bodily rebellion 
against his own will is a miniature version of his will’s rebellion against the divine. This 
dual-natured rebellion, as Augustine views it, is the structure of shame. In other words, 
self-difference is an affective correlate to man’s difference from God. Despite strict 
prohibitions from the divine, the “lustful” members of man’s body may be moved 
without the will’s consent because the flesh itself may be uncontrollable. Thus, shame 
ensues. The theological precepts in City of God find an important analogue in 
Augustine’s autobiographical Confessions, where Augustine expresses his own push and 
pull between shame and pleasure. In his Confessions, Augustine reveals the gnawing at 
his own will—a tension between flesh and will that he himself cannot resolve, even 
despite prayers to God. He wishes to free himself from his habit which oppresses him, yet 
begs this liberation to be delayed, claiming, “Grant me chastity and continence, but not 
yet” (VIII.vii.17). And even after he undergoes his conversion, he notes the longing or 
desire never fully goes away, particularly in his memory/sleeping state (X.xxx.41). 
Considering these moments from both City of God and Confessions, we can understand 
that an Augustinian understanding of shame and ethics has to do with the disrupted 
relationship between man and God due to the uncontrollability of the flesh. For 
Augustine, fallenness is punishable by a “justified” sense of shame. 
 Alain’s ethics is similarly structured around acts contra naturam, a term that 
encompasses a wide range of possibilities, but that presents sexual acts, specifically 
sodomy, as a signal example. During the Middle Ages, the term ‘sodomy’ was being 
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invented. In The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology, Mark D. Jordan claims that 
medieval authors, specifically those of the early twelfth century, attempted to create a 
working definition of ‘sodomy’ by examining past texts. As Jordan notes, however, the 
problem with this kind of process toward a concrete definition was the murkiness of the 
sources. For example, the Biblical story of Sodom never explicitly associates the sin of 
the Sodomites with same-sex copulation. According to Jordan, “there is explicit scriptural 
evidence that the sin of the Sodomites was some combination of arrogance and 
ingratitude” (32). Thus, despite the absence of Scriptural evidence, many medieval 
writers seemed to infer a connection between the ‘sin’ of the Sodomites and perverse sex, 
especially from St. Augustine’s reading of the Old Testament in his Confessions, 
claiming that their sin was a “violent eruption of disordered desire itself” (35).2 Working 
from former texts such as Augustine’s, some medieval writers characterized sodomia by 
some sort of ‘deviant,’ ‘unnatural’ sex. In Alain’s text, ‘sodomy’ has much to do with 
same-sex practices, mainly male-male; however, it also has to do with gender oscillation. 
In the opening metre, the dreamer laments sodomitic practices, noting, “The active sex 
shudders in disgrace as it sees itself degenerate into the passive sex. A man turned 
woman blackens the fair name of his sex” (67-68). Inherent in the dreamer’s complaint of 
sexual acts that are contra naturam is a fundamental complaint of gender disruption. It is 
not only that the sexual act occurs between two men, but that one inhabits the space of 
passivity, a space traditionally considered to be “womanish.” As I will explicate, Alain’s 
conceptualizing ‘sodomy’ as extending into the realm of gender pushes against criticism 
that has mainly focused on Alain’s interest in sexuality. Additionally, it reveals how 
                                                          
2
 For a more in-depth examination of varying analyses of the Biblical story of Sodom, consult the section 
titled “Misreading Sodom” in Jordan’s second chapter (30-37). 
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‘sodomy’ as a term was not just confined to sex practices. For Alain, gender issues are 
also implicated in his conception of ‘sodomy.’  
 Considering the import of acts contra naturam, we see how sexuality in Alain’s 
text, just as in Augustine’s, is a push and pull between shame and pleasure. To start, 
shame complicates the individual’s ability to traverse acts or behaviors that were once 
characterized by pleasure, or rather, a familiar/identifiable pleasure. In other words, 
similar to its depiction in City of God, shame, in the Plaint, is produced from feeling 
ashamed over something that, at one time, provided pleasure. If we examine the 
aforementioned part of the dreamer’s lament, we notice how shame is characterized by 
loss. To reiterate, the dreamer notes, “The active sex shudders in disgrace as it sees itself 
degenerate into the passive sex” (67-68). For the phrase “shudders in disgrace,” the Latin 
is “se turpiter horret.” Although Sheridan translates “turpiter” as disgrace, it also 
translates as deep shame. Shame, in short, drives the text’s main complaint; it is the 
affective form that engenders the Plaint. This response—that of shuddering shamefully—
is self-reflexive in that the active sex feels and experiences a sense of shame over its own 
“degeneration.” In other words, the active sex hadn’t viewed itself as degenerative or 
disgraceful before this degeneration; therefore, Alain describes a shift from pleasure to 
shame. The active sex had taken delight in the acts and behaviors it once deemed familiar 
and enjoyable, but no longer does due to its witnessing these become sources of shame. 
The active sex’s shame, however, is produced not only from witnessing its own 
degeneration, but rather from the fact that witnessing is the extent of the active sex’s 
relationship to that degeneration. In other words, the active sex “sees” and despises its 
own degeneration, but also is powerless to stop it. This degeneration is uncontrollable; it 
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is outside the confines of the will’s consent. Here, we are reminded of Augustine. As we 
saw in Confessions, Augustine felt powerless to stop his lustful members from rebelling 
against his will. Although he considered himself shackled to this uncontrollable habit, he 
still recognized its pleasure, claiming, “Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.” 
Thus, much like the Augustinian view, shame in Alain’s text resides in this gap between a 
perception of degeneracy that accompanies pleasure. Essentially, then, the degeneration 
of the active sex into the passive sex is characterized by shame because such 
degeneration produced pleasure and was uncontrollable, thus leaving the active sex 
powerless and ashamed. 
 Interestingly, shame motivates poetic production, making it the salient feature of 
Alain’s representation of sexuality. The dreamer cultivates this poetic project because of 
an affective experience, making clear that “The Muse implores, grief itself orders, Nature 
begs with tears I give them the gift of a mournful ditty” (67). To put aside Nature’s role 
in prompting this poem for a moment, I would like to focus on the affective piece here. It 
is grief which orders the dreamer to produce a “mournful ditty.”  As David J. Fine notes, 
the dreamer cultivates this poetic project out of affective experience: “[…] this mournful 
emotion leads the dreamer to poetry. Affect begets poetics” (18). But, on my reading, 
more than just grief prompts the dreamer to engage in this poetic project; there is also 
shame.  When the text opens, the dreamer reveals his own affective response to the 
degeneration of mankind, noting, “I turn from laughter to tears, from joy to grief, from 
merriment to lament, from jests to wailing” (67).  Here, the dreamer is moved to poetry 
not simply though the lament and grief where he arrives, but also through the rapid 
alternation between pleasure and despair. It is shame, born out of the rapid shifts between 
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pleasure and lament, which compels the dreamer to produce. Because of this, I believe 
the dreamer is part of the group he is essentially condemning: sodomites. To be clearer, 
the dreamer has obviously shifted from a state of ‘merriment’ to one of ‘lament.’ 
Although we are not aware of the precise ‘thing’ that has brought him laughter and joy, 
we do know that he has ceased taking pleasure in it. This is precisely the same experience 
the active sex undergoes as it “sees itself degenerate.” And, because Alain claims that 
sodomitic practices involve this degeneration in terms of sexuality and gender. By 
placing the dreamer’s comment regarding the active sex’s disgrace alongside his own 
grief-stricken opening confession, we see how the dreamer’s identity collapses into that 
of the active sex, or more specifically, the sodomite. In other words, the dreamer, in 
lamenting his own loss of pleasure, articulates the same experience of shame as the 
sodomite. 
 The stakes of proposing that the dreamer views himself as a sodomite are radical 
if we consider Alain’s position. Just as the dreamer is moved to poetic production 
through alternations between pleasure and grief, Alain creates the actual text itself. As a 
priest, Alain was chaste, so his potential self-identification as a sodomite in the text is a 
remarkable association with a group within the church that Alain participated, in the 
Third Lateran Council, in condemning anew. As Larry Scanlon argues, the movement of 
Alain’s narrative is “not from pleasure to renunciation [of homoeroticism], but indeed 
from one sort of pleasure to another…the pleasure of power” (220). Here, Scanlon claims 
that there is pleasure in condemnation itself; however, I believe that is potentially getting 
reframed here. If Alain, just like the dreamer, is implicated in pleasure, he is 
simultaneously seared with shame. As I have already suggested, the coincidence between 
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pleasure and disgust is constitutive of shame, not merely for Alain, but in a Christian 
theological tradition. The collapse of the dreamer and the sodomite suggests that Alain is 
not actually focused on the strict regulation of sexuality contra naturam. Rather, my 
reading argues that the poem’s aesthetics are a part of understanding its ethical reflection 
on the Church’s increasingly stringent regulatory practices. Thus, Plaint of Nature 
ashamedly reflects on endeavors, like the Third Lateran Council, to standardize acts con 
naturam and repress those considered contra naturam. 
 Further, the dreamer’s shamed response to Lady Natura’s grief supports the idea 
that shame drives the Plaint’s poetry and its ethics. The dreamer witnesses his source of 
pleasure become a site of shame because Nature herself deems it as such. For example, as 
the dreamer continues his opening lament, he notes how Nature herself has responded 
with grief before he himself has: “[…] Nature begs that with tears I give them the gift of 
a mournful ditty” (67). By making explicit her own sorrowful affect, Nature stimulates 
the dreamer’s affective response. More specifically, it is only because Nature has 
revealed her own grief and disapproval that the dreamer interprets his former source of 
pleasure as now a source of shame. For instance, the dreamer notes how “Nature weeps,” 
which anticipates his own “tears” and “wailing.” It seems that without Nature’s 
mourning, the dreamer would not mourn, nor would he experience shame. If Nature had 
not explicitly condemned the active sex’s practices, the active sex, and thus the dreamer, 
would not perceive their pleasure as shameful. If it sounds as though this is an example of 
social stigmatizing, in which Lady Natura shames the dreamer for his pleasure, it is worth 
bearing in mind that Natura is—quite explicitly—a manifestation of the dreamer’s own 
sensory perception of the created world. As Kathryn Lynch notes in The High Medieval 
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Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy and Literary Form, the dream vision genre contains 
allegorical characters that function as “reflections of the Dreamer’s evolving 
consciousness.” Natura is one of these imaginative projections. According to Lynch, 
Natura is “related both to the created world over which she is a goddess and also to the 
mode of knowing proper to assist an individual in knowing himself through that world” 
(17). This is important to bear in mind because it means that the dreamer is not simply 
responding to shame, but mentally, imaginatively residing in it. We must remember that 
this dream vision is indeed just that: a dream. Thus, Lady Natura is inscribed in human 
consciousness. It is because of Lady Natura—the dreamer’s own Nature—that the 
dreamer creates. Nature’s grief is essentially the dreamer’s own affective response of 
shame, and thus, the dream itself comes into fruition. Essentially, then, the entire dream 
vision is not only a response to shame, but a performance or inhabitation of it. 
III. Alain’s Hermaphrodites and an Unstable Natura 
 Affect, specifically shame, fundamentally begets the dreamer’s poetic project, and 
thus the dream vision itself. But I am also struck by Alain’s interest in that which is 
“queer.” I believe the modern term “queer” is an appropriate analogue to acts contra 
naturam in the Middle Ages because the “natural” has been sustained as an idealized, 
normative standard for human behavior. It is this “queer” sexuality that proves to be a 
vector of shame. As I have mentioned, most criticism has been focused on sexuality in 
the poem, citing historical moments and movements relating to “deviant” sexualities. For 
instance, Larry Scanlon argues that Plaint of Nature was conceived on the brink of the 
Third Lateran Council, which served as the “first fully institutional, comprehensive 
sanction of the same-sex practice,” thus, legally repressing homoerotic sexuality (218). 
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Scanlon argues that Alain, who attended the Council, was quite self-conscious and even 
deliberative in his homophobia—evidence being the Plaint. Thus, this focus on same-sex 
practice had much to do with the “invention” of sodomy because it collapsed sodomia 
with “unnatural” sex practices, as Mark Jordan notes. 
 But it is more than just sodomy that Alain grapples with in Plaint of Nature. 
Criticism that has been focused on sexuality has not attended in depth to Alain’s related 
interest in gender. Yet, Alain is as deeply interested and engaged in gender as he is in 
sexuality; thus, I treat Alain as a theorist of sexual and gender poetics. More specifically, 
I argue that the Plaint of Nature codes all sexuality as sodomitic because it is also 
hermaphroditic. In the Plaint, Alain collapses the identities of the sodomite and the 
hermaphrodite. In other words, hermaphroditism is part of the sodomite’s very identity. 
For example, inherent in the dreamer’s opening lament of shame is a complaint against 
“queer” sexual acts and gender disruption. As we have seen, the dreamer bewails, “The 
active sex shudders in disgrace as it sees itself degenerate into the passive sex.” This, as I 
have noted, has to do with the active sex’s experience of shame—an experience 
characterized by a loss of pleasurable power. However, the dreamer goes further, 
lamenting, “A man turned woman blackens the fair name of his sex. The witchcraft of 
Venus turns him into a hermaphrodite” (68). Alain merges the sodomitic identity with the 
hermaphroditic identity because the former, in seeking to lie with the same sex, 
essentially oscillates between genders. For Alain, the hermaphrodite becomes 
characteristic of the sodomite’s identity. Inherent in this same-sex copulation is gender 
flexibility. As the lament suggests, a man turns not into a woman, but womanish. Thus, 
even though fundamentally a man anatomically, s/he is also womanish in terms of 
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gender. The hermaphrodite, then, is the living embodiment of the combination of 
genders—a hybrid figure in opposition to the natural order. In medieval medical 
literature, sexual and gender hybridity was seen as against the “natural” because any 
aspect of male or female that did not distinguish him/her from the opposite gender was 
viewed as unnatural, or contra naturam. In Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle 
Ages: Medicine, Science, and Culture, Joan Cadden highlights this, noting, “Differences 
between males and females in general and between men and women in particular were, 
according to medieval opinion, natural…The central features distinguishing females and 
males were, in short, part of their natures and part of Nature” (188-89). The physiological 
differences between men and woman were viewed as being inextricable from both their 
identities as human beings and the understanding of the characteristics of nature. Thus, 
anything that deviated from this was seen as breaching the “natural order.” 
 If we move even further into the dreamer’s opening lament, we discover that 
Alain’s hermaphrodite is not a hybrid strictly in the sex and gender senses; s/he is also as 
such because of grammatical perversions. Alain understands the relationship between 
sex, sexuality, and gender, between anatomy, acts, and identity, and between sodomy and 
hermaphroditism, grammatically. The leap to grammar is the next step we as readers 
need to take because, as I have already suggested, the Plaint’s aesthetics are a part of 
understanding its ethical reflections on regulatory efforts of “queer” sexuality. Grammar 
is a component of the text’s aesthetics, and thus, is important to Alain’s project in that he 
relies on it in order to explicate hermaphroditism. Thinking and explicating in the 
languages of sex and grammar, Alain dismantles the rules of Latin grammar by making a 
claim for duality in terms of gender and grammar. As Cadden explains: 
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  Latin grammar, the basis of his polemic, has three fully functioning  
  genders – masculine, feminine, and neuter – and Alan even entertained  
  briefly the idea of placing nonreproductive males (sodomites, who are  
  effectively sterile, and eunuchs) within the domain of the third. Rather  
  than undermine the rules of sex and their implications for gender,   
  however, Alan chose to dismantle the rules of grammar by declaring that  
  nature and grammar have just two genders and that neuter is a different  
  type of form, a negative and confused category (225). 
Hence, Alain explicates his understanding of the relationship between sexual acts and 
sexual anatomy via linking sexual perversion to grammatical perversion. For instance, the 
aforementioned opening lament of the dreamer establishes the hermaphrodite as not only 
a sexually perverse being, but also a gender deviant. As the dreamer complains, “He is 
subject and predicate: one and the same term is given a double application. Man here 
extends too far the laws of grammar. Becoming a barbarian in grammar, he disclaims the 
manhood given him by nature” (68). Here, gender fluidity is not only grounded in 
“proper” sexual acts, but has seamlessly disturbed appropriate syntax.  According to the 
dreamer, the typical, or “natural”, role of the male, particularly in copulation, is active 
and initiatory, characteristic of the role of the subject in a sentence. On the other hand, 
the female’s role is one of passivity and receptivity, much like a sentence’s predicate, 
which receives the action from the subject. What turns man into a hermaphrodite is the 
access, availability, and engagement in receptivity. In other words, what is “barbaric” is 
that a receptive male automatically becomes a hermaphrodite, even if he has normative 
genitalia. Thus, the dreamer condemns the mutability of gender because it abuses both 
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‘natural,’ or anatomical, gender identity and proper grammar. The ability to switch 
between masculine and feminine in the realm of gender, sexual acts, and grammar serves 
as the antithesis to the natural (i.e. is contra naturam) because it does not fit the 
established binaristic confines (masculine/feminine). The hermaphrodite, a prototype of 
defect, evidently violates these confines. 
 Lady Natura’s instructions to Venus likewise also foreground the link between 
sexual and grammatical perversions. God gives Nature the task of hammering out the 
coinage of creatures on the appropriate anvils—a task that Nature eventually delegates to 
Venus. Lady Natura discusses grammatical rules as they relate to her instructions to 
Venus: “[…] I gave instructions that…she [Venus] should not…tolerate a situation where 
the active type, by appropriating an additional meaning, goes over to the passive or the 
passive, laying aside its proper character, returns to the active or where a verb with a 
passive ending retains an active meaning and adopts the rules of deponents” (158-59). 
Here, Alain is trying to rework Latin grammar in order with Nature. In other words, he 
uses his own binaristic conception of Latin grammar to forward an argument against the 
oscillation between gender identities and sexual acts. Essentially, Alain seems to 
advocate maintaining fixed roles via the explication of active and passive verbs—that the 
two have their own functions and cannot, nor should not, attempt to adopt that of the 
other. 
 So it seems. Alain remains bound to a figure who is vulnerable to hermaphroditic 
perversions. In Plaint of Nature, Nature herself is not held stable. She, too, is implicated 
in the text’s main “complaint.” In his book Sodomy, Masculinity and Law in Medieval 
Literature: France and England, 1050–1230, William Burgwinkle makes this issue 
 17 
evident, claiming, “She [Lady Natura] is the creator of the world, in some way external to 
it, and yet contained within its imperfection. Though she and the narrator single out 
sodomy as the principal source of natural corruption, it is clear that ‘sodomy,’ ‘Nature,’ 
and nature’s ‘creation’ all remain within the same symbolic confines” (171). It is evident 
that Nature herself is trapped within her imperfect creation, and thus, she becomes 
inextricably linked with the world’s “corruption,” or to use Alain’s terms, man’s 
“degeneration.” In fact, Alain depicts Lady Natura as hermaphroditic. For instance, the 
tools that Lady Natura must use—the hammer and the anvil—denote sodomitic and 
hermaphroditic practices simultaneously. While the hammer resolutely represents the 
active male, the anvil carries a dualistic meaning. In most cases, the anvil represents the 
female, who is viewed as “naturally” passive; however, it also represents the passive 
male partner, a figure viewed as contra naturam. Thus, the tools that Nature works with 
are representative of hermaphroditism—and also explicitly productive of hermaphrodites 
themselves. Mark Jordan claims that Nature’s hermaphroditic quality is her ability to 
beget with these tools of masculinity, even though she is resolutely feminine (71). I 
would like to expand his argument a tad further by suggesting that it is Nature’s ability to 
use both instruments in the procreative process that makes her hermaphroditic.  In other 
words, Nature’s hermaphroditism originates from her ability to handle both tools. She 
must be able to utilize them before she can beget with them. Moreover, it is not only that 
she is a feminine figure who works with tools of masculinity. This reading holds gender 
more stable than I am arguing Alain’s text does. Rather, Nature herself is a “queer” figure 
who is able to use hermaphroditic tools (the hammer and anvil). This destabilizes not 
only gender, but a fixed, idealized Natura. 
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 In addition, Lady Natura seems to be hermaphroditic in her inability to reproduce 
aesthetics, or, the process of giving birth to new things through artistic means. Although 
she is the one who mandates the dreamer to produce his poems, she does not seem to 
have the ability to sustain creativity. In Prose 2 of Plaint of Nature, Lady Natura is 
depicted as a writer. Alain describes her writing process as being effortless, but 
unfruitful: “With the aid of a reed-pen, the maiden called up various images by drawing 
on slate tablets. The picture, however, did not cling closely to the under-lying material, 
but quickly fading and disappearing, left no trace of the impression behind. Although the 
maiden, by repeatedly calling these up, gave them a continuity of existence, yet the 
images in her projected picture failed to endure” (108). It is clear via Nature’s struggling 
generative process in maintaining the images that, while Nature has a creative ability, she 
lacks the power needed to produce everlasting poems. But this moment isn’t really about 
poems; rather, it concerns procreation. As Sheridan states in a footnote, “Nature’s action 
here may symbolize the continuation of the human race by the birth-death cycle” (108). 
While Nature may be showing the dreamer the rapidity of existence, I think it has to with 
her own inability to sustain created beings. She gives beings a “continuity of existence,” 
yet they “fail to endure.” Her failure, I believe, is grounded, once again, in her 
implementation of gendered tools. Although Nature claims to be resolutely feminine,
3
 she 
implements an instrument that is closely associated with masculinity. More specifically, 
Nature uses the reed-pen, a tool that impregnates and creates new ‘beings’—the images 
on the tablets. Nature’s attempt to exist as a being—specifically a procreative being—
                                                          
3
 The initial description of Natura is a conventional representation of idealized feminine beauty. In Prose 1, 
the dreamer notices the sheen of her hair, the radiance of her face, the beautiful imagery of her dress, and 
the concealment of her members (implying her virginal state) 
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who is resolutely feminine, yet performs with a masculine tool is unsuccessful. The 
images don’t last because hermaphroditism does not yield reproduction. Lady Natura 
serves as the hermaphroditic example of an engagement in artistic pleasure, rather than 
reproductive purpose. Just as Nature has attempted to create mankind with the 
“appropriate anvils” (155-56), she still does so with a hermaphroditic anvil. 
Unsurprisingly, an inherently hermaphroditic tool used by a hermaphroditic creator will 
reproductively fail. 
 Nature’s hermaphroditic qualities matter to Alain’s project as a whole in that they 
hint toward Alain’s own interest in sexuality and gender. First, Lady Natura is not only a 
faculty of the dreamer’s imagination, but also of Alain’s own authorial faculty. Nature’s 
hermaphroditism disrupts traditional criticism regarding the text’s insistence on the 
regulation of sodomy. As Burgwinkle argues, Nature and Alain collapse into one another: 
“Where we look for Lady Nature behind the surface of textual description we find instead 
only Alain’s own fantasy: Alain as writer/preacher/defender of tradition/dispenser of 
discipline, speaking for and through her” (173). While it may be true that Alain speaks 
for and through Nature—that Alain is Lady Natura in drag, as Burgwinkle claims—I find 
Alain does the opposite of defend “tradition.” It is not that Alain seeks to regulate the 
sodomitical as a separate act outside of heteronormative relations, as Scanlon has argued. 
Instead of attempting to impose strict regulations, this reading shows that Alain is more 
interested in showing that all sexual relationships are actually queer relationships to an 
idealized Natura. Alain shows how even Natura herself inhabits and embodies this very 
“queerness.” In other words, for Alain, shame is constitutive of sexuality in all its 
forms—and perhaps most deeply in those forms of sexuality that would claim for 
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themselves any ethical high ground. In that respect, Alain’s Plaint of Nature may be a 
critique of the regulatory impulse emerging out of the Third Lateran Council. One danger 
of the Third Lateran Council’s prohibitions against sodomy was that they might make 
sexual acts con (with) natura appear to be ethical rather than shameful. The Plaint of 
Nature, however, proposes a medieval ethics of shared, encompassing shame in tension 
with regulatory hierarchies. Thus, Natura as a hermaphrodite is important because it 
reveals that Nature herself cannot be securely held as one “thing,” cannot decry a fixed 
“problem,” because she herself inhabits the very problem she seemingly condemns or 
bewails. Calling on Nature to “set things right” is insufficient because of Nature’s own 
inherent hermaphroditism. Calling on or for a “norm” is impossible, because, to be fully 
‘normal’ is, strictly speaking, impossible. Even Nature herself isn’t the “norm” because 
she isn’t consistent in terms of sexuality or gender. 
IV. A Return to Shameful Pleasure/Pleasurable Shame 
 And thus, it is no surprise that the dreamer represents himself as hermaphroditic 
as well, since Lady Natura is a figure for his own perception of the natural world, his 
remaking of that world in his own reason. Thus, because Lady Natura is a figure for the 
dreamer’s own rational and sensory perception of the natural world, her hermaphoditism 
is something that the dreamer himself has—in effect—created. And, it turns out, his own 
hermaphroditism is a reflection of her image because she is an intrinsic part of the 
dreamer. After the dreamer openly laments gender oscillation in Metre 1, he moves into 
his honeycomb speech—a poetic articulation of his unstable gender identity. When the 
dreamer mentions the beauty of Helen of Troy, he begins to wonder why such lovely 
maidens are left with uncultivated kisses: “Why do so many kisses lie fallow on maidens’ 
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lips while no one wishes to harvest a crop from them? If these kisses were but once 
planted on me, they would grow honey-sweet with moisture, and grown honey-sweet, 
they would form a honeycomb in my mouth. My life breath…would go out to meet the 
kisses…so that I might thus expire” (70-71). This statement suggests the dreamer’s shift 
in gender identity and carries sodomitic implications. Whose kisses does our narrator 
mean to harvest? Does our narrator desire the lips of the maiden, or the kisses given to 
her by men? While both readings are sound, I believe the latter provides us a way of 
reading Alain’s text through the lens of ‘unnatural’ sex, gender, and sexuality. One 
possibility is that he desires the same-sex kisses, in which case we can see this as a 
sodomitical moment. Another possibility is that he identifies with the maiden, in which 
case it is a gender-crossing moment. In either case, we can see how “disordered” gender 
and “disordered” sexuality overlap with one another for Alain. For instance, the kisses 
emphasized here are not the maiden’s, but ones that “lie fallow” on her lips. This implies 
that the dreamer fantasizes the original giver(s) of these uncultivated kisses: men. 
Furthermore, this moment intimates the dreamer’s hermaphroditic nature, which is 
presented to us when the dreamer employs the phrase, “If these kisses were but once 
planted on me” (71, my emphasis). This implies that the dreamer has imagined himself 
shifting into the passive role due to the fact that he is the recipient, rather than the giver, 
of these kisses. But the dreamer has clearly asserted his masculinity in condemning the 
unmanning of man three pages prior with his bold statement, “The active sex shudders in 
disgrace as it sees itself degenerate into the passive sex” (67-8). For this reason, we are 
able to characterize the dreamer as a hermaphroditic figure because he simultaneously 
associates himself with masculinity and femininity. It is not only the fact that he desires 
 22 
to be kissed instead of initiating the kissing, but also that these kisses seem to impregnate 
the dreamer with honeycombs. Here, the dreamer’s passive role is again emphasized in 
that the kisses given to the maiden by men are depicted as impregnating the male 
dreamer. Therefore, the dreamer is established from the onset as a kind of hermaphroditic 
figure due to his oscillating between gender positions. And, to rearticulate, a receptive 
male automatically becomes a hermaphrodite, despite normative genitalia. Essentially, in 
the dreamer’s honeycomb fantasy, we are reminded that Alain deploys sodomitical sex 
and hermaphroditic gender as being inseparable from one another. 
 Coming just after the dreamer’s poetically provocative experience of shame, this 
honeycomb speech is entrenched in pleasure. The language used in this monologue seems 
much more intimate, or pleasurable. The alternation between pleasure and disgust, as it is 
explicated by the dreamer’s opening lament and the subsequent honeycomb speech, 
celebrates hybridity. The coexistence of pleasure and shame reveals the fact that they are 
inseparable for the dreamer. But the oscillating affect does not merely prompt the 
dreamer’s poetic production. It is also a structural feature of the text itself. The Plaint, in 
its formal qualities, goes back and forth between poetry and prose. It may be argued that 
Alain is simply adhering to the traditional format of the dream vision genre; however, I 
would like to suggest that Alain’s text is itself hermaphroditic in its alternations. It is a 
hybrid of rhetoric. Just as there is essentially no stabilized “natural order,” since Natura 
herself is a queer figure, and just as the dreamer alternates between pleasure and disgust, 
so does the text itself refuse to sustain a stable formal quality. Thus, the text’s formal 
qualities dovetail its thematic interests in sexuality and gender. In terms of the 
shame/pleasure dichotomy, any form of pleasure, including that inherent in condemning 
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others, should be, in ethical terms, subject to shame as well. The only ethical pleasure is 
that which is positioned in shame—not cleansed of it. The broader stakes of the textual 
hybridity suggest that any account of the natural order is mired in perverted grammar, 
sodomitic desires, and hermaphroditic identifications. Thus, any strict regulation of 
anything contra naturam is impractical. 
 In suggesting that all pleasure is implicated in shame, Alain codes all sexuality as 
queer. And it is this queerness that proves to be a vector of shame. To highlight this, let 
us turn to the paradox of the “upright” man. In Metre 6, Lady Natura comments on 
fraudulence. She returns to the degeneration of mankind, linking man’s fraudulence with 
his lack of shame for things against the “natural order,” although as we have seen, there is 
no stable natural order. All accounts of such are “queer” because they are not free of 
perversions of sexuality, gender, and even grammar. This lack of shame from upright 
men, however, is what Lady Natura deems “fraudulent,” noting,  
  Without shame a man, no longer manlike, puts aside the practices of man.  
  Degenerate, then, he adopts the degenerate way of an irrational animal.  
  Thus he unmans himself and deserves to be unmanned by himself (168). 
Here, Lady Natura suggests that the unnatural qualities of man have to do with man 
abandoning his own humanity. Man, in lacking shame, strips himself of all that is 
“manlike,” and, instead, adopts animal-like practices. Shame, as it is explicated here, is a 
particularly human emotion, due to man’s relationship to the divine, as well as man’s 
relationship to his neighbor. Here, then, Alain suggests that ethics exceed the confines of 
man/God relationship. It is also about interpersonal, earthly relations. In this moment, the 
public looks to these upright men in order to understand how to be respectable beings. 
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People seek to understand ethics by communicating with these upright men. These 
relations are breached when man ceases to repent his “unnatural” acts, or lacks shame, 
and thus, abandons his humanity—his “nature.” Thus, ethical relations shift from a 
vertical hierarchy (man  Nature  God), but rather to a horizontal plane (man-man). 
Nature’s demanding that the active sex feel shame for considering “unnatural” acts, 
behaviors, and identities pleasurable seems to again suggest that shame constitutes a 
loss—both of pleasure and of communication or relations between individuals. 
Essentially, I propose that Alain’s aim, as it is explicated here, also has to do with 
showing that all relationships are actually queer interpersonal relationships. 
 Plaint of Nature, especially this section, actually urges us to recognize that ethical 
personal relations are hard—they at once bemoan shame, yet require it. Metre 6 involves 
the pressure of uprightness, if we situate it within the context of Alain and his audience. 
As I have mentioned, Alain himself was a priest, writing as a chaste member of the 
Church, for an audience that was much involved in attempting to repress “queerness.” 
Given the historical context, Lady Natura’s potentially targets the Christian male, who is 
constantly striving for, yet failing in uprightness. In her claiming that, “Without shame a 
man, no longer manlike, puts aside the practices of man,” we see how the notion of 
Christian masculinity is founded in shame. In other words, a man—a Christian cleric or 
layman—who does not have or feel shame is not manlike. There is the emphasis on the 
necessity for shame, especially for Christian masculinity. In other words, here, the text 
suggests that to be an upright (Christian) man requires shame. Shame, then, becomes a 
fundamental part of Christian masculinity. 
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 But this is indeed the paradox: There is a pressure to remain an upright Christian 
man, but this uprightness is undercut by shame. In other words, individuals look to and 
respect these men as models of uprightness, yet they [the men] have shame and have 
fallen short because of a lack of shame (it makes them “no longer manlike” and “put 
aside the practices of man”). This paradox is reflected in the syntax, which is not only 
extremely difficult in terms of comprehension, but also disordered. Considering the same 
phrase, “Without shame a man, no longer manlike, puts aside the practices of man,” we 
see how the syntax turns back on itself; it is not so direct about the relationship between 
shame and Christian masculinity. This syntactical reflexivity in Lady Natura’s comments 
on the upright man is potentially another hermaphroditic moment. The fact that the 
syntax itself is reflexive—that it at once relies on, yet complicates itself—reflects the 
hermaphroditic qualities of the Plaint.
4
 We notice how the syntax, in its reflexivity, 
works against the logic. It potentially serves to expose how ethical relations are 
themselves difficult because individuals strive to remain upright, but shame complicates 
this endeavor. Essentially, this moment suggests that a model of uprightness is always a 
failure because of shame. Shame is at once a symptom of moral failing, and that without 
which moral perfection is impossible. 
 Lady Natura’s condemnation of the shameless upright man, then, may also make 
us, the readers, examine ourselves, wondering if we feel shame for pleasure, or are frauds 
for not feeling shame at all. As Mark Jordan argues, Alain’s text surely wants to “change 
                                                          
4
 As Fine argues, language in a medieval work—the words themselves—mirrors sex acts. As he notes, 
“[…] within medieval thinking, language is structured like a sex act. The affiliation between sex and text 
allows the medieval mind to recognize language’s failure to (re-)produce meaning resolutely. The medieval 
subject is one always threatened by the non-procreative pleasures of both sex and text and is therefore, a 
born sodomite” (2). Although Fine discusses the relationship between Book of the Duchess and Plaint of 
Nature than about the Plaint itself, his claim that language resembles a sex act in (some) medieval works 
aided me in theorizing about this particular sentence in Metre 6. 
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its readers by showing them images of themselves as they are and as they ought to be. It 
will shame them to abandon sin” (68). But I do not believe the goal of Alain’s text is that 
simple. It seems that Alain’s text shows readers that we cannot escape sin, how we are 
fundamentally human, and how we can only inhabit our shame more fully. In other 
words, shame is not the mode of abandoning sin, but rather the mode of understanding 
that sin is inescapable—and most especially in those moments when we strive to cleanse 
ourselves of it. Even in the act of reading—in attempting to navigate the disordered 
syntax—we find ourselves feeling ashamed. Are we unable to navigate the language 
because it is, itself, a hybrid? As I have already mentioned, the Plaint, in its formal 
qualities, perplexes readers due to its oscillating between poetry and prose, its inhabiting 
shame and pleasure simultaneously. Thus, the text’s formal qualities make it difficult for 
readers to “make sense.” The Plaint’s implicit hermaphroditism—the reflexive quality of 
the syntax and formality—may cause us to find ourselves feelings shame. The syntax 
requires us to read and reread and read again in order to (somewhat) figure out what the 
text is suggesting. As Lynch suggests, “[…] at times the most primary levels of meaning 
may be rendered obscure to us” (78). We, the readers, are implicated in the text’s 
syntactical chaos, just as these upright men get caught up in the complexity of shame and 
the paradox of uprightness. We are troubled by our inability to adequately and deftly 
make meaning from textual disorder. And yet, that shame we feel, that failing, is the 
point the dream vision seeks to instill in us. Though we are entrenched in shame, we are, 
at the same time, implicated in pleasure. We experience the coexistence of both affects. 
In recognizing that the only ethical pleasure is that which is marked by, not cleansed of, 
shame, we, too, are Alain’s hermaphrodites—our members rebelling against us. 
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V. Contemporary Queer Interest in the Ethics of Shame 
 Every “accomplice”—the dreamer himself, “upright men,” we the readers—
experiences shame in recognizing the loss of pleasure once associated with a particular 
act, behavior, or identity. Alain, the medieval theorist of both sexual and gender poetics, 
opens the space for us as readers (like the dreamer) to self-examine and respond to 
“ethical” conundrums with both shame and pleasure. In recognizing that everyone, even 
“upright” men, experience shame, yet embrace pleasure despite that shame, I believe 
individuals—both medieval and contemporary subjects—can forge ethically productive 
relations. For ethics dismisses neither, but requires both. This is what, I believe, has been 
threaded throughout theoretical history (perhaps unconsciously). In other words, 
contemporary queer theories carry more historical and conceptual connections to 
medieval, religious attitudes toward sexuality than we might think. For instance, the 
contemporary theories of Michael Warner and Leo Bersani are representative of a queer 
interest in the ethics of shame. 
 In The Trouble with Normal, Warner comments on how shame (acts/doing) and 
stigma (identity/being) have tended to blur into each other within modern-day queer 
culture, noting,  
  Sexual deviance once was more a matter of shame than of stigma. Sodomy 
  was a sin like fornication, not the sign of an identity. Anyone could do it.  
  In the modern world that shame has deepened into stigma. As moralists  
  began concentrating not simply on deeds but on kinds of persons, mere  
  sex became sexuality. The act of sodomy came to be only one sign of  
  homosexual identity among many (28).  
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As Warner explains, there is no longer a difference between being a homosexual and 
engaging in sodomitic acts, according to contemporary society. Rather, it considers the 
homosexual identity as characterized by “doing” sodomy, just as sodomitic deeds are 
quantifiers for being homosexual. Although Warner is writing about present-day 
society’s perceptions of homosexuality, his explication surprisingly echoes the dreamer’s 
opening lament, as well as Lady Natura’s delegations to Venus in the Plaint. As I have 
mentioned, the dreamer and his own imaginative faculty (Lady Natura) bewail and 
criticize man’s shifting between subject/male and predicate/female, for this has disrupted 
“manhood.” It concerns an act that has become an identity, which Warner suggests is 
contemporary society’s complaint. While Warner, here, is developing Foucault’s 
argument about acts versus identities,
5
 I suggest that this connection between medieval 
and contemporary theories revise that oft-cited claim about the Middle Ages. It might 
have been a moment when there was no homosexual identity, as such, but it was also a 
moment in which all human identity was rooted in sexual perversion. As I have proposed, 
Alain emphasizes hermaphroditism to explicate this notion (that all individuals are 
implicated in shame). Warner makes a similar move in citing indignity as the indicator of 
collective experience: 
  If sex is a kind of indignity, then we’re all in it together. And the   
  paradoxical result is that only when this indignity of sex is spread around  
  the room, leaving no one out, and in fact binding people together, that it  
  begins to resemble the dignity of the human (36). 
                                                          
5
 From the first volume of Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality. 
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Both Alain and Warner envision an ethics of shared, encompassing shame—one that 
cannot be regulated because it implicates all individuals. Thus, the medieval-modern 
trajectory speaks to the instability of sexual “norms.” 
 In addition to Warner’s theory, Bersani’s articulation of the simultaneous embrace 
of shame and pleasure unite his and Alain’s ethics. In “Is the Rectum a Grave?” Bersani 
discusses the constitutive elements of male homosexual identity and desire, which 
includes this tension between shame and pleasure. For Bersani, this particular gay male 
identity involves struggling against definitions of maleness and homosexuality articulated 
and regulated by heteronormative society, but also recognizing the “renewable sources of 
excitement” that come from such definitions (209). In other words, there is a struggle 
against the inherently shameful definitions that oppress gay males in particular, all the 
while desiring those definitions. Bersani thus emphasizes pleasure, even in the face of 
shame. Just as the Plaint’s dreamer and formal qualities inhabit two seemingly 
paradoxical realms, so too does Bersani’s theory communicate the oscillation between 
shame and pleasure. Although an individual experiences shame, s/he may still return to 
its source due to its pleasurable aspect. Shame, then, can be a source of excitement. Thus, 
while sources of pleasure can yield shame, sources of shame can also yield pleasure. 
 Essentially, this is an important trajectory to understand because it shows that 
heterosexuality, too, has always been shamed. Even if normative sexuality has enjoyed 
material and social benefits historically (a point that has been crucial for tracing the 
repression and oppression of homosexuality), it is worth remembering that sexuality 
apparently con (with) naturam is not so elevated as it might pretend to itself. Indeed, 
Plaint of Nature, as a poetic document positioned right at the moment in which sodomy 
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was invented and stigmatized, reminds us that the regulatory impulse is an ethical failure 
in so far as it seeks to cleanse normative sexuality of its shame. This historical trajectory 
of shamed sexuality, from the twelfth century to now, reveals how the trouble with 
“normal” is that “normal” is volatile, no matter what the time period. Thus, such a 
stringent regulation of sexuality contra naturam is not only futile, but impossible because 
we are all implicated in “queer” sexuality. And thus, just as Alain’s syntax turns back on 
itself, just as Nature cannot be held stable throughout the Plaint, so too does the 
contemporary “natural order” become self-reflexive—a reflection of the shameful, yet 
pleasure-seeking hermaphrodite in all of us. 
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